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I n an unsigned opinion, the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed in United States v. 
Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633 (1997)(per 
curiam), that federal judges may 
use convicted defendants' related 
but acquitted conduct in deciding 
their sentences, provided that the 
conduct is established by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. In so 
holding, the Court eliminated a 
discrepancy between the Ninth 
Circuit and the other federal 
circuits when it found neither a 
federal statutory nor a constitu-
tional bar against consideration of 
this type of conduct. As a result, 
judges may evaluate any related 
acquitted charges of the defendant 
in determining sentences. 
The Government combined 
two similar cases, United States v. 
Watts, 67 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1995), 
and United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 
1386 (9th Cir. 1996), in its petition 
for writ of certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court. In the first 
case, Vernon Watts was charged 
with possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute and use of a 
deadly weapon in furtherance of a 
drug trafficking crime. At trial, he 
was convicted on the drug charge 
but acquitted on the gun charge. 
Upon sentencing, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern 
District of California found the 
gun charge related to the drug 
charge by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Accordingly, it in-
creased Watts's sentence by two 
points pursuant to the United 
States Sentencing Guideline 
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Manual. On appeal, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit set aside the sen-
tence, holding that the district 
court erroneously connected the 
gun charge with the higher 
sentence. 
In the second case, Chery I 
Putra was charged with two counts 
of aiding and abetting possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine. 
Putra was convicted on one count 
at trial. The United States District 
Court for the District of Hawaii 
found, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Putra's involvement 
in the second charge warranted an 
upward departure under the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual, resulting in a stronger 
punishment. On appeal, the 
United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
sentence, holding that the district 
court should not have considered 
the acquitted charge, since the 
combined charge would punish 
Putra for acquitted conduct. The 
petition for writ of certiorari 
followed. 
Beginning its analysis, the 
Court examined federal statutory 
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law enacted prior to the Sentencing 
Guidelines. It stated that a court 
has enormous discretion to 
examine all relevant factors in the 
sentencing process. Watts, 117 S. 
Ct. at 635 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 
3661). The Court reinforced its 
opmIOn by pomtmg to a 
substantial body of case law 
holding that prior conduct 
"'[h]ighly relevant - if not essen-
tial - to the [the judge's] selec-
tion of an appropriate sentence is 
the possession of the fullest infor-
mation possible concerning the 
defendant's life and char-
acteristics. ", Id. (quoting Williams 
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 
(1949)). The Court also criticized 
the departure of the court of 
appeals from "'well established'" 
precedent. /d. (quoting United 
States v. Done/son, 695 F.2d 583, 
590 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
The Court next turned its 
attention toward evaluating the 
meaning and intent of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual and Commission. Id The 
Court explained that provisions in 
the Guidelines closely mimic 
federal statutory law in that they 
also afford broad discretion to 
sentencing courts to "consider, 
without limitation, any information 
concerning the background, char-
acter and conduct of the defen-
dant." [d. at 635-36 (quoting U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1B1.4). Specifically, the Court 
noted that the Guidelines directly 
pennit courts to weigh all relevant 
conduct flowing from the facts and 
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 89 
Recent Developments 
circumstances of the convicted 
charge, "whether or not it resulted 
in a conviction." Id. at 635-36 
(citing U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ IB1.3, 
IB1.3(a)(2), cmt., background.). 
Finally, the Court determined that 
Congress intended the Guidelines 
to "at a minimum . . . provide 
additional penalties when 
defendants are convicted of multi-
ple offenses." Id. at 636 (citing 28 
U.S.C. § 994(1)). 
In reversing the court of 
appeals, the Court rejected the 
argument that heightened sen-
tences penalize defendants for ac-
quitted conduct. Id. at 636. The 
Court instead pointed to case law 
holding that increased sentences 
punish criminals for "the manner 
in which [they] committed the 
crime of conviction." Id. (citing 
Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 
2199, 2207-08 (1995)). In ad-
dition, the Court rejected the 
argument that a verdict of not 
guilty denotes the "rejection" of a 
set of facts by the jury which 
precludes the facts from use by the 
sentencing court. Id. at 63 7 (citing 
United States v. Brady, 928 F .2d 
844, 851 (9th Cir. 1991), 
abrogated on other grounds, 
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 
738 (1994)). In distinguishing the 
terms "acquittal" and "innocent," 
the Court explained that a verdict 
of not guilty means only that the 
Government's evidence failed to 
meet proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Thus, a finding of not 
guilty does not mean that the jury 
rejected the given set of facts. Id. 
(citing United States v. One 
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 90 
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 
U.S. 354, 361 (1984)). In sum, the 
Court concluded that a sentencing 
court may properly use a de-
fendant's acquitted conduct to 
elevate the defendant's respective 
sentence, so long as the conduct is 
proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Id. 
In his concurring opinion, 
Justice Breyer conceded that the 
law permits judges to consider 
related charges of which the 
defendant was acquitted when 
sentencing a convicted defendant. 
Id. at 638. Nevertheless, he added 
that the Sentencing Commission 
holds the power to pass a provision 
eliminating this information from 
being considered by sentencing 
judges. Id. at 638-39. In a sep-
arate concurring opinion, Justice 
Scalia refuted Justice Breyer's 
position, maintaining that the 
power to prohibit consideration of 
this acquitted conduct rests solely 
with Congress. Id. at 638. 
In a lengthy dissent, Justice 
Stevens noted that the purpose of 
18 U.S.C. § 3661, enacted before 
the Guidelines, was to allow the 
judge to consider relevant conduct 
of the defendant only in areas 
where a judge had discretion to 
rule. Id. at 639. He maintained 
that, since the imposition of the 
Guidelines, judicial discretion has 
been substantially eliminated. Id. 
Moreover, the statute fails to 
clarify the relative weight to be 
afforded this evidence. Id. In Part 
II of his dissent, Justice Stevens 
criticized the majority for their 
failure to conduct oral argument on 
the issues given the seriousness of 
increased deprivation of citizens' 
liberty. Id. at 641. In Part III, he 
dismissed the case law relied upon 
by the majority as unpersuasive, 
since these cases: (1) did not 
directly address the issue of burden 
of proof in sentencing cases; (2) 
were factually distinguishable; and 
(3) were narrow in their applica-
tion. Id. at 642-43. For these 
reasons, Justice Stevens concluded 
that judges should only be per-
mitted to consider those charges 
that have been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt in deciding sen-
tences for convicted defendants. 
Id. at 643-44. 
In a separate dissenting 
opinion, Justice Kennedy briefly 
conceded that the opinion of the 
ninth circuit could have been 
reversed solely because it ignored 
the existing legal precedent of 
every other circuit. Id. at 644. 
Next, he criticized the majority for 
their refusal to distinguish un-
charged conduct from acquitted 
related conduct. Id. He also noted 
that the concurring opinions and 
Justice Stevens's dissent amplify 
the notion that the role of the 
Sentencing Commission is unclear. 
Id. Thus, Justice Kennedy main-
tained that the majority should 
have heard oral argument on this 
case and their failure to do so 
precluded him from joining them 
in their decision. Id. 
In United States v. Watts, the 
United States Supreme Court reaf-
firmed that the federal judiciary 
possesses enormous discretion to 
consider all relevant conduct in the 
sentencing process. So long as 
there exists the requisite proof by 
preponderance of the evidence, 
federal judges are free to consider 
any and all conduct arising out of 
a common scheme of criminality 
for which the defendant has been 
convicted. No longer maya defen-
dant be shielded by an acquittal on 
a separate but related charge. This 
decision may reflect the Court's 
response to public pressure to curb 
crime and punish criminals. Thus, 
provided there is a judicial finding 
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of a preponderance of the evi-
dence, judges may in effect dis-
regard an acquittal and use the 
charges as a vehicle to lengthen 
defendants' sentences. 
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 91 
Recent Developments 
27.2 U. BaIt. L.F. 92 
